INTRODUCTION
During the last few years, many new services for distributed systems were developed. They usually rely on some kind of trust between the entities involved. In particular this is true when an authentication service is required for secure systems. Most existing systems require an entity to trust another entity either completely or not at all. That means that an entity cannot express its trust restricted to certain capabilities or to a certain degree. Furthermore, there is often a xed hierarchy of trust relationships (Birrell et al. 1986 , CCITT 1988 , Gligor et al. 1992 , Lampson et al. 1991 . If, for example, an entity A needs to gain trust into a remote authentication server D, it can ask an already trusted server B to recommend D. I f B does not trust D, i t m a y ask another server C along the hierarchy for a recommendation of D. This can be iterated until the desired trust relationship is established. If the trust relationships are indeed organized as a hierarchy, trust derivations are simple. But if in our example A distrusts an entity C on the shortest path to D, it will never gain trust in D since there are no alternative w ays which a void C in a hierarchy.
To o vercome these problems, Yahalom, Klein, and Beth (1993) have i n troduced a more di erentiated view of trust in distributed systems. Several trust classes are de ned and individual trust relationships between entities are considered. The xed structure of trust relationships between the servers is given up and a new trust derivation algorithm is introduced. A forwarding algorithm under slightly di erent assumptions is given by Y ahalom, .
Because trust is not only a question of trust or distrust, Beth, Borcherding, and Klein (1994) presented trust values and their derivation in distributed systems. Trust is measured between 0 and 1, and functions for the derivation and combination of trust values are given. A more limited type of trust values is already implemented in PGP (Zimmermann 1994) . In this system, an entity can bind shades of trust to public keys of trusted entities. These shades (unknown, untrusted, marginally trusted, completely trusted) express the trust in the recommendation capabilities of others. If an entity receives a previously unknown public key with recommendations of known entities, it checks whether the weighted sum of the trusted entities' shades exceeds a certain threshold. For example, two marginally trusted entities may be deemed as credible as a completely trusted entity a n d it takes two completely trusted entities to judge a public key as valid. These weights can be selected by each e n tity. H o wever, when recommending a key, a n e n tity cannot express a level of trust in the key's authenticity, since the estimation of trustworthiness of the previous signers is considered private.
In this paper, we i n troduce a technique for the computation of trust values which takes into account the values of the respective e n tities on a path without revealing them. The individual trust relationships and the trust derivation algorithm of Yahalom, Klein, and Beth (1993) are used. This algorithm will be implemented in the SELANE Protocol (Beth 1991 , Horster and Knobloch 1992 , Bauspiess and Knobloch 1989 and be made readily available in its proposed release in the Internet.
PRELIMINARIES
In this section we give a n o verview of the formal representation of trust and trust values. For a more detailed description, the reader is referred to (Beth, Borcherding, and Klein 1994, Yahalom, Klein, and Beth 1993) .
We assume the following underlying model of a distributed system: The system consists of entities which communicate via links. Each e n tity has a unique identi er and may h a ve a secret which can be used for authentication purposes. The entities can generate, read Preliminaries 3 and modify any message on any link. Entities may h a ve some computational power, e.g., for the encryption and decryption of messages.
To model degrees of trust, we need the notion of numbers of positive/negative experiences. W e assume that an entity can assign a certain number (value) to each task it entrusts to another entity. This number can be thought o f a s t h e n umber of ECU (European Currency Unit) being lost when the task is not ful lled. Each lost or not lost entrusted ECU increments the number of negative or positive experiences by o n e .
Since there is no need to trust an entity completely if one expects it only to perform a limited task, trust can be granted in distinguished trust classes, e.g., trust in key generation or trust in keeping secrets.
Direct trust and recommendation trust
For each of the classes of trust there are two types of trust: direct trust and recommendation trust. T o trust an entity directly means to believe in its capabilities with respect to the given trust class. Recommendation trust expresses the belief in the capability o f a n e n tity to decide whether another entity is reliable in the given trust class and in its honesty when recommending third entities.
Recommendation trust can be granted in a restricted manner. Constraints can be imposed on the properties of the recommending entities further along the path as well as on the entities which are eventually recommended as being directly trustworthy. These properties can include the very names of entities, their domains or the number of entities on the path so far. The constraints are used to express distrust towards entities or towards paths with certain properties. Due to the di erent notions of direct trust and recommendation trust, we present their formal representations separately. Direct Trust P trusts seq x Q value v A direct trust relationship exists if all experiences with Q with regard to trust class x which P knows about are positive experiences. seq is the sequence of entities who mediated the experiences (the recommendation path) excluding P and Q. v i s a v alue of the trust relationship which is an estimation of the probability t h a t Q behaves well when being trusted. It is based on the number of positive experiences with Q which P knows about.
Let p be the number of positive experiences. The value v z of these experiences is computed as follows:
This value is the probability that Q has a reliability of more than , founded on the information P possesses about Q. The reliability is the probability t h a t Q turns out to be reliable when being entrusted with a single task, i.e. a task of value 1. If there have been negative experiences, there is no trust relationship.
The parameter h a s t o b e c hosen once for the whole system. It determines the threshold for the reliability under consideration. If one wants the trust value to express the We regard a recommendation as propagation of positive experiences.
probability that an entity is more reliable than 0:9, one chooses accordingly. Since is known within the system, each e n tity can recompute its trust values locally to express di erent reliability thresholds. Recommendation Trust P trusts:rec seq x Q when:path S P when:target S T valuev A recommendation trust relationship exists if P is willing to accept reports from Q about experiences with third parties with respect to trust class x. This trust is restricted to experiences with entities in S T (the target constraint set) mediated by e n tities in S P (the path constraint set). Again, seq is the sequence of entities who mediated the recommendation trust. v is the value of the trust relationship. It represents the portion of o ered experiences that P is willing to accept from Q and is based on the experiences P has had with the entities recommended by Q.
Given numbers of positive and negative experiences p and n, respectively, w i t h t h e recommended entities, the recommendation trust value v r is computed according to the following formula:
Representation of the Constraint Sets The constraint sets need not be stated explicitly. It su ces to specify predicates which decide the membership of an entity to the set in question. Such a predicate could be \is-child-of(x, A)" which w ould be true if x i s a c hild of A in a given hierarchy and hence describes implicitly the set of all children of A. These predicates have to be decidable to be useful in this context. The predicates may depend on the trust expressions they are evaluated in. If the predicate in the example above i s c hanged into \is-child-of(x, current-entity)" it de nes the set of children of the trusted entity. As can be seen in the next section, predicates can be taken over from initial trust expressions into derived ones with di erent trusted entities so that the same predicate applies to di erent instances of current-entity. When used as path constraint set, the given sample predicate would restrict the recommendation path to a descending path in the given hierarchy. A constraint set of this type re ects distrust in paths with certain properties and is not coined to distrust certain entities.
Deriving trust relationships
Here we g i v e the rules of inference. The rst rule is concerned with the derivation of direct trust from recommendation trust and direct trust (i.e., recommendation of direct trust). The second rule describes how new recommendation trust can be derived from two recommendation trust expressions (i.e., recommendation of recommendation trust). Notational details are described below. x R when:path S P 2 when:target S T 2 valuev 2 8X : ( X 2 l seq 2 R ) (X 2 s S P 1^X 6 2 l P seq 1 )) ) P trusts:rec seq 1 Q seq 2 x R when:path (S P 1 \ S P 2 ) when:target (S T 1 \ S T 2 ) value(v 1 v 2 )
The symbol denotes concatenation of sequences or appending of elements to a sequence, the predicates 2 l and 2 s denote the membership of elements to a sequence or to a set, respectively. The function in the derivation of direct trust is de ned as v 1 v 2 = 1 ; (1 ; v 2 ) v 1 :
This formula is based on the computation of the direct trust according to formula (1) 
Combination of trust relationships If there are several derived trust relationships towards an entity with respect to the same trust class, the values of these relationships can be combined to yield a unique value. This combined value is usually higher than each o f t h e v alues involved in the combination. Since we do not need this technique in our paper, the reader is referred to (Beth, Borcherding, and Klein 1994) 3 COVERED TRUST VALUES
In this section we i n troduce a technique for the derivation of trust values which does not reveal the actual values to other entities. It shows a certain similarity to the concept of path constraints. Consider a setting with the following trust relationships (the trust class KSstands for \keeping secrets"): If entity A wants to nd another entity w h i c h is trustworthy with respect to trust class x with a value of at least v min , it sends a message to B of the following form:
A ! B : fA B ts 1 S P 1 S T 1 v min v 1 x g K ; A fmg K ;
A denotes a message signed with the secret key of entity A. ts 1 is a timestamp and S P 1 andS T 1 denote those parts of the constraint sets which express distrust towards path properties, not towards explicit entities (see section 2.1). Distrust towards entities is dealt with later. The value v min v 1 is the minimum trust value B has to have in the nal entity. y Thus the value v 1 is not revealed, if A keeps v min as secret which i s i n i t s o wn interest.
Since the message is fresh and B does not have a direct trust relationship, it has to consider to ask C for a recommendation. For C to be suitable for this task, it has to be in the setS P 1 . F urthermore, B has to believe C to be trustworthy w i t h r e s p e c t t o not collaborating with A to deduce the trust value v 2 , i.e., with respect to keeping the contents of the following message secret: B ! C : fB C ts 2 S P 1 \S P 2 S T 1 \S T 2 (v min v 1 ) v 2 x g K ;
B
Since C trusts D with respect to class x, it compares v 3 against the value given in the message. If the trust value is higher or equal and D lies withinS T 1 \S T 2 , it informs B about the fact that D is su ciently trustworthy f o r A. Since B did not include its distrusted entities in the target constraint set, it now has to check whether it distrusts D. If this is the case, it has to continue the search b y asking other trusted entities for recommendations if possible. If B does not distrust D, it informs A about the successful search. A checks again whether it distrusts C or D and, if that is not the case, can use the services of D.
For example, the server D could be a Key Distribution Center. Users of such a n a uthentication service are able to authenticate other principals of the system based on their individual trust relationships without revealing trust values.
The technique described above can also be applied for delegation. Delegation in distributed systems is a process where an entity, t h e delegator, delegates another entity, t h e delegate, to be its proxy. The delegator gives its rights or parts of its rights to the delegate which then acts in the name of the delegator. Hence, the delegator has to nd an entity which is capable and trustworthy to act as delegate. If the delegator does not know such an entity i n a d v ance and is not willing to trust any e n tity, it can ask for recommendations for su ciently trustworthy e n tities. The minimum degree of trustworthiness required and the trust classes involved can be selected individually for each task to be delegated.
In the previous paragraphs we described how t o n d a p a t h t o a n y trustworthy e n tity. A similar method can be applied if an entity received a message which is signed by some entities, so that the trust path is already given. To nd out about the trustworthiness of the message, the receiver starts the protocol as above and includes the path of the signing entities in the path constraints. The entity will get back an answer which s a ys whether it can accept the message as su ciently trustworthy.
Secrecy properties
We are mainly concerned with an entity not learning how m uch it is trusted by others. To extract a single trust value during the given protocol, the two e n tities before and after the trusting entity w ould have to collaborate. To a void such a collaboration is the responsibility of the entity i n b e t ween. It is the only entity a ected by the collaboration and it chooses the next entity on the path by itself.
A collaboration of entities which h a ve more than one entity b e t ween them could yield the product of the trust values of the enclosed entities. This is a leakage of information which has to be accepted if the trustworthiness of path is to be evaluated.
As stated above, we a void the exposure of distrust by splitting the constraint sets in distrust towards individual entities and distrust towards properties of the trust paths. We claim that the latter need not be kept secret, since it merely describes a derivation policy as it is used in traditional hierarchical systems. Individual distrust, on the other hand, is a private matter and is not propagated during trust derivation.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we h a ve s h o wn that considering trust values a private matter does not imply the uselessness of these values for the evaluation of trust paths. We h a ve proposed a t e c hnique to nd entities which are trustworthy to a given degree with respect to a given trust class without exposing the individual trust values. Our technique is not completely free of information leakage, but we argue that this price is not too high for being able to use the values.
